During the last few years there has been a renewed analysis in currency unions as a form of monetary arrangement. This new interest has been largely triggered by the Euro experience. Scholars and policy makers have asked about the optimal number of currencies in the world economy. They have analyzed whether different countries satisfy the traditional "optimal currency area" criteria. These include, among other: (a) the synchronization of the business cycle; (b) the degree of factor mobility; and (c) the extent of trade and financial integration. In this paper I analyze the desirability of a monetary union from a Latin American perspective. First, I review the existing literature on the subject. Second, I use a large data set to analyze the evidence on economic performance in currency union countries. I investigate these countries' performance on four dimensions: (a) whether countries without a national currency have a lower occurrence of "sudden stop" episodes; (b) whether they have a lower occurrence of "current account reversal" episodes; (c) what is their ability to absorb international terms of trade shocks; and (d) what is their ability to absorb "sudden stops" and "current account reversals" shocks. I find that belonging to a currency union has not lower the probability of facing a sudden stop or a current account reversal. I also find that external shocks have been amplified in currency union countries. The degree of amplification is particularly large when compared to flexible exchange rate countries.
I. Introduction
During the last few years there has been a renewed interest in analyzing the costs and benefits of monetary unions. To a large extent this interest has been the result of the launching of the Euro in January, 1999. Scholars, policy makers and analysts have asked what is the optimal number of currencies in the world. More specifically, they have asked whether it would make sense for some countries to give up their national currencies and either adopt another country's currency, or join other nations in creating a regional currency. The first option -adopting another country's currency -has generally been known as the "dollarization" question; the second option -creating a multi-nation currency -is known as the "independent currency union" question. and territories used other county's currency as legal tender. These arrangements were dictated both by political as well as by geographical and economic considerations. This is illustrated by the fact that the dependencies of Great Britain did not use exclusively sterling; they relied on a variety of currencies, including the U.S. dollar and the Indian Rupee (Muhleman, 1895) .
Historically, the emergence of national currencies has been associated with political considerations and, in particular, with sovereignty. Indeed, one of the first measures newly independent countries took during the nineteenth and twentieth century was to establish their own national currencies. In his well-known article on optimal currency areas Mundell (1961) Although the supporters of this policy were prominent thinkers and politicians, and went as far as detailing the operational features of the union, there was very little political support for the idea. 2 Proposals to create a monetary union in Central America, or the Andean countries or, more recently, in Mercosur have never been more than academic exercises. In a way this is surprising, since, at least in principle, certain groups of Latin
American nations would seem to satisfy some of the basic criteria for an optimal currency area (OCA). In particular, the degree of trade and financial integration will tend to increase in countries that share a common currency. 5 In Table 1 I present a list of countries (and territories) with currency unions; this list includes both dollarized countries as well as countries that belong to independent currency unions.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze a number of issues related to monetary unions from a Latin American perspective. I take, however, a different perspective from that of most works on the subject. Instead of analyzing whether the Latin American countries satisfy the traditional OCA criteria, such as facing similar external shocks across countries, I analyze the empirical evidence on the economic performance of countries "without a currency of their own," and I interpret these results from the perspective of the Latin American nations. The empirical analysis presented in this paper is divided in two parts. First, I investigate whether belonging to a currency union reduces the probability of a country being subject to: (a) "sudden stops" of capital inflows; and/or (b) "current account reversals." Both of these are important questions, since the Latin American nations have traditionally been subject to significant fluctuations in capital flows, and have experienced a large number of current account crises (Edwards, 2004) .
Second, I analyze the ability of monetary union countries to accommodate three types of external shocks: (a) terms of trade shocks; (b) sudden stops of capital inflows; and (c) current account reversals. The question is whether, as opponents of monetary unions have argued, countries without a currency of their own incur in larger adjustment costs as a result of external shocks. Again, this is a highly relevant issue for the Latin American nations, since they have historically had highly volatile terms of trade, and have been subject to wide variations in external conditions (Edwards and Levy-Yeyati, 2005) . In performing this analysis I use a new and large cross-country data set, and I control for the role of other relevant variables.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II I review the literature on currency unions in Latin America. I show that the vast majority of these papers analyze whether the Latin Countries -or a subgroup of them -satisfy the OCA criteria.
In Section III I use a new comparative data set to analyze economic performance in countries with currency unions, from a Latin American perspective. More specifically, I
investigate whether countries without a currency of their own have a lower probability of 5 See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1999) and Rose and Engel (2002 Section V I provide some concluding remarks, and a word of caution on how to interpret the empirical results presented in this paper. There is also a data appendix.
II. Monetary Unions in Latin America
In this section I discuss briefly and selectively the literature on currency unions in Latin America. I define a country as belonging to a currency union if it does not have a currency of its own, and uses a "common currency" with other countries. This "common currency" could be either another nation's currency (i.e. the U.S. dollar or the Euro) or it could be a regional currency. The section is divided in two parts: First, I briefly deal with the theoretical literature on optimal currency areas. In particular, I discuss what has come to be known as the "OCA criteria," or prerequisites for a country successfully joining a currency area. Second, I provide a brief review of the empirical literature on currency unions in Latin America.
II.1 Optimal Currency Areas: Theory and Policy Criteria
In his seminal 1961 paper Robert Mundell developed the modern theory of optimal currency areas. The main conclusion of his analysis was that "the optimum currency area is the region." By this, Mundell meant that when it comes to determining the scope of specific currency, the relevant entity is not a nation, but rather a region characterized by price and wage flexibility, factor mobility, trade integration and similar external shocks. He argued that the in North America there were two optimal currency areas: one corresponding to the eastern United States and Canada, and the other corresponding to the western U.S. and Canada.
Although Mudell's original contribution is not technical -indeed, there isn't a single equation or diagram in the paper --, he was very explicit in determining his optimality criteria. According to him, " [O] ptimality is here defined in terms of the ability to stabilize national employment and price levels' (Mundell 1961, p. 179) . That is, his criterion is perfectly equivalent to minimizing a loss function on the square deviations of employment from its long term trend level, and of inflation from its target. In that sense,
Mundell's criteria of optimality is consistent with that used in modern macroeconomic analyses.
Subsequent research attempted to make Mundell's theory operational, by developing a "checklist" of criteria that countries should satisfy in order to qualify as candidates for a (successful) currency union. 6 Generally speaking, it was though that in countries than satisfied these criteria the benefits of joining a currency union exceeded the costs of doing so. • Factor mobility, and in particular labor mobility, across the members of the potential union.
• High level of trade in goods across the members of the union.
• Different (or diversified) composition of output and trade across countries.
• Price and wage flexibility across members of the union.
• Similar inflation rates across countries.
• Financial markets should be integrated across countries.
• Absence of "fiscal dominance" in the individual countries.
• Low, and similar, levels of public sector debt in the different countries.
• Similarity (or synchronization) of external shocks to which the different countries are exposed to.
• Political coordination across countries.
The main point of this "Decalogue" is that if these conditions are met, the members of the union would not need to rely heavily on (bilateral) exchange rate changes when subject to external shocks. Countries that satisfy the Decalogue would have a reduced need for implementing "expenditure switching policies." Thus, for these countries the benefits of a currency union -in terms of enhanced credibility, lower transaction costs, and lower and more stable inflation -would exceed the (potential) costs of giving up the exchange rate as a policy tool. As Tavlas (1993) and Mongelli (2002) , among others, have pointed out, such an extensive list of prerequisites introduces a number of practical policy problems. These include: (a) the need to establish a ranking of criteria according to their importance; and (b) how to deal with cases when a potential OCA member satisfies some of the criteria, while another potential member satisfies a different subset of them. The Euro zone, for instance, prioritized fiscal, monetary and financial considerations through the Maastricht Treatise. This, however, needs not be the case for other currency unions.
One of the costs of a belonging to a currency union is that member countries give up monetary independence. However, the extent to which monetary independence is actually lost will depend on the exact nature of the monetary union. If the country in question unilaterally adopts another nation's currency -as in the case of unilateral dollarization -monetary independence will be fully lost. Moreover, in this case, seignorage will also be lost. In Latin America, for example, this has been the case in Panama, Ecuador and El Salvador.
8 If, on the other hand, a new common currency is adopted, monetary independence will only be lost partially. This is so because members of the union will be represented in the governance structure of the new common central bank, and, at least in principle, would have a say on how the common or regional central bank policies are determined.
8 See Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) .
There are circumstances, however, when loosing monetary independence may not be a cost. This would be the case, for instance, if the country in question has historically abused this independence, and has generated very high levels of inflation. Indeed, under these circumstances giving up the national currency and joining a currency union is a way of "tying the policy makers' hands," and achieving credibility. This "credibility effect"
of joining a monetary union -or more precisely, of joining a credible monetary unionhas been emphasized with respect to the Euro zone and the new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe. It has also been discussed in the Latin American context as one of the advantages of (unilateral) dollarization. This point was made by Dornbusch (2001) , who argued that by achieving credibility, Latin American countries that dollarized would experience a decline in (real) interest rates, and, thus, higher investment and faster growth.
As a number of authors have argued, many of the criteria listed in the "OCA Decalogue" listed above are endogenous to the monetary and exchange rate regime (Frankel and Rose, 1998) . More specifically, (neighboring) countries that share a common currency will experience an increase in bilateral international trade in goods, a point forcefully made by Rose (2000) , and Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) , among others. Edwards (1999), and Powel and , on the other hand, have investigated the way in which the monetary regime affects interest rate behavior and the cost of capital, and have argued that a common currency will tend to increase the degree of financial integration. An implication of this endogeneity argument is that the "OCA Decalogue" should be analyzed in a forward-looking fashion, trying to determine what would be the effect of adopting a common currency on many of these variables and criteria once the union is implemented.
II.2 Currency Unions in Latin America: A Selective Review
Most studies on OCA in Latin America have analyzed whether the countries in the region satisfy the OCA criteria, or, more specifically, a subset of them. In this subsection I review some of the most important contributions to this literature
In an influential early paper, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) used Vector Auto
Regressions to construct series of supply and demand disturbances in three regions:
Europe, Asia and the Americas. 9 They then analyzed whether these disturbances were symmetrically distributed across the different countries in each of the regions. Their results indicate that correlations of both output and inflation disturbances were low in the Americas. Moreover, the groups of countries in the America's region that exhibited a somewhat higher degree of correlation did not correspond either to NAFTA or Mercosur.
For instance, the group with the highest co-movements in output and prices was Brazil,
Ecuador and Peru. The authors conclude that there is no evidence supporting the formation of a currency union involving Latin American countries -either among themselves, or with the U.S. or Canada. Eichengreen (1998) He argued, however, that a regional currency was not an effective option for reducing volatility; in his view the countries of Mercosur did not satisfy many of the OCA criteria.
Licandro Ferrando (2000) and Lavagna and Giambiagi (2000) also analyzed whether the countries of Mercosur satisfied (some of) the OCA criteria listed in our "Decalogue." Licandro Ferrado (2000) focuses mostly on one of the synchronicity of real shocks. He constructs measures of supply shocks for Mercosur, NAFTA and the EU and analyzes the extent to which these are correlated across countries. He concludes that the degree of correlation among Mercosur nations is significantly lower than that of EU nations. Shocks correlations among NAFTA countries are somewhat higher than in
Mercosur. His conclusion is that Mercosur is far from satisfying the OCA criteria.
Lavagna and Giambiagi (2000) take a somewhat different approach, and concentrate on macroeconomic convergence and political coordination. After analyzing historical data 9 The Americas include 13 nations, including those in NAFTA and Mercosur.
for Argentina and Brazil, and simulating macroeconomic conditions, the authors concluded that in (late) 1998 the large countries of Mercosur were not ready for forming a monetary union.
Larrain and Tavares (2003) use data for South and Central American countries to
analyze the extent to which some of the OCA criteria are satisfied. An important contribution of their paper is that the authors make a distinction between two types of currency unions: dollarization and regional currencies. They use an approach similar to that of Eichengreen (1998) and use regressions to analyze the determinants of real exchange rate volatility. They also analyze the degree of asymmetry (or lack of synchronization) of output shocks, the composition of exports, and the extent of bilateral trade. Based on their analysis they conclude that dollarization maybe an option for the Central American nations; neither dollarization nor a regional currency appears to be a good option for South America.
Horchreiter and Siklos (2002) credibility. They conclude that "an independent common currency does not appear to be warranted for Latin American countries," and that "there is no obvious case for dollarization."
In an extensive study, Hochreiter, Schmidt-Hebbel and Winckler (2002) analyzed Latin America's prospects for a currency union, from the perspective of the European experience. They make the important point that OCA criteria are dynamic, in the sense that countries that adopt a common currency tend to experience an improvement in some of the key OCA prerequisites, such as the volume of bilateral trade and the degree of financial synchronization. Based on the European experience, the authors emphasize the need to coordinate fiscal policy in OCA countries. They also discuss the importance of labor mobility and flexibility, and financial integration and supervision. (2003) is one of the few that provides an explicit and complete cost-benefit analysis of the decision to join a currency union. They analyze whether it would pay off for the Central American nations to give up their currencies and unilaterally adopt the U.S. dollar as legal tender. 10 They consider several benefits of dollarization, including lower real exchange rate volatility, increased credibility, reduced financial fragility, and a higher volume of intraregional trade. The main source of costs is the lost of monetary independence; the extent of these costs are related to the nature of real shocks, the degree of labor mobility, and the extent to which the monetary authorities are willing to use their independence (this is the "fear to float" issue). Their conclusion is that "several of the countries under study should give dollarization a serious consideration." Edwards and Magendzo (2003, 2006) than countries with a currency of their own. Inflation has been significantly lower in dollarized countries, while GDP volatility was larger in dollarized economies.
After recognizing the endogeneity of many of the OCA criteria, Calderón, Chong and Stein (2002) investigated the likely effects of adopting a common currency on Latin America's intraregional trade and business cycle synchronization. Their results suggest that, contrary to the findings by Frankel and Rose (1998) and Rose and Engel (2001) for the EU, the impact of a currency union on these two variables is rather small in the Latin American region. 
III.1 Sudden Stops and Current Account Reversals in Latin America
Latin America's economic history has been characterized by recurrent and massive external crises. Large devaluations have rocked the economies of almost every country at one point or another during the last six decades. Many of these crises had their origins on large "sudden stops" of capital inflows, and/or were characterized by large and very rapid "current account deficits reversals." as an abrupt and major reduction in capital inflows to a country that up to that time had been receiving large volumes of foreign capital. More specifically, I imposed the following requirements for an episode to qualify as a "sudden stop": (1) the country in question must have received an inflow of capital (relative to GDP) larger than its region's third quartile during the two years prior to the "sudden stop." And (2), net capital inflows must have declined by at least 5% of GDP in one year. 13 On the other hand, a "current account reversal" -reversals, in short --is defined as a reduction in the current account deficit of at least 4% of GDP in one year.
12
14 As may be seen from Table 2 , the global historical incidence of sudden stops has been 6.4%. Different groups of countries, however, have experienced very different realities, with the incidence being highest in the Middle East (11.3%) and lowest in the advanced nations (3.7%). The Latin American nations have the second highest incidence of sudden stops, with almost 8% of all year-country observations.
The tabulation on current account reversals in Table 3 indicates that the aggregate incidence rate has been 12.8%. As may be seen, Latin America has had one of the highest incidence of current account at 16%; the advanced (industrial) countries have had the lowest incidence at 2.4%.
15
From an analytical perspective sudden stops and current account reversals are highly related phenomena. There is no reason, however, for their relationship to be oneto-one. Indeed, because of changes in international reserves, it is possible that a country that suffers a sudden stop does not experience at the same time a current account reversal.
An analysis of the global data indicates that for the complete sample (3,106 observations) 46.8% of countries subject to a sudden stop also faced a current account reversal. At the same time, 22.8% of those with reversals also experienced (in the same year) a sudden stop of capital inflows. The regional data show that joint incidence of reversals and 13 In order to check for the robustness of the results, I also used two alternative definitions of sudden stops, which considered a reduction in inflows of 3 and 7 of GDP in one year. Due to space considerations, however, I don't report detailed results using these definitions. 14 I also used an alternative definition. The qualitative nature of the results discussed below, were not affected by the precise definition of reversals or sudden stops. See Edwards (2004) . 15 As pointed out above, the Latin American nations have also been subject to recurrent large devaluation crises. Of course, these are eliminated if a country becomes "dollarized." Independent currency unions eliminate bilateral devaluations in the member countries; it is still possible, of course, that the common currency suffers a major devaluation relative to a convertible currency. This was the case of the CFA Franc in January, 1994. 
III.2 An Empirical Model
A number of studies, including Edwards (2002 Edwards ( , 2004 and Frankel and Cavallo (2004) have found that sudden stops and current account reversals are costly in terms of growth. Countries that experience either of these phenomena have gone through significant and rather large declines in the rate of GDP growth. An important question, and one that I address in this Section, is whether a country's exchange rate/monetary regime affects the probability of experiencing a sudden stop or a current reversal. In particular, I am interested in understanding whether countries that belong to monetary unions have had a lower probability of experiencing these phenomena. A positive answer to this question would be important for the Latin American nations, as it would provide them with an institutional arrangement that would help them reduce the incidence of these negative events. In other words, reducing the probability of sudden stops and/or current account reversals would constitute an additional "benefit" of currency unions, a benefit that should be taken into account when evaluating the net effects of abandoning the country's currency and joining a union.
In order to understand further the forces behind sudden stops and current account reversals, and to investigate the (potential) role of currency unions, I estimated a number of panel equations on the probability of experiencing these two penomena. The empirical model is given by equations (1) and (2): The lagged ratio of the country's fiscal deficit relative to GDP. (f) The country's initial 16 See, for example, Rose (1996), Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000) and Edwards (2002) .
GDP per capita (in logs)
. And, (g) a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the country in question belongs to a currency union. This dummy is called CU. The coefficient of this variable is of particular interest in this analysis, since it captures the effect of currency unions on the probability of a country experiencing a reversal or a sudden stop. As is discussed below, in some of the regressions I interact the dummy variable CU with other regressors.
III.3 Basic Results
The results obtained from the estimation of this variance-component probit model for a sample of large countries are presented in Table 4 . 17 Columns A through C refer to the probability of a current account reversal; columns D through F are for a sudden stop of capital inflows. I first discuss the results for current account reversals.
As may be seen, the vast majority of coefficients have the expected sign, and many of them are significant at conventional levels. The results may be summarized as follows:
Larger (lagged) current account deficits increase the probability of a reversal, as does a (lagged) sudden stop of capital inflows. The results also support for the contagion hypothesis: the variable that measures the incidence of sudden stops in the county's region is significantly positive in all of the equations. There is also evidence that a faster rate of growth of domestic credit increases the probability of reversals. Countries with higher GDP per capita have a lower probability of a reversal (coefficient marginally significant in some regressions). Form the perspective of this paper, the most important result is that the coefficient of the currency union dummy is not significant in any of the regressions. In order to investigate whether CU affected the probability of a crises in an indirect way, I also included it interacted with other of the regressors. 18 Once again, the coefficient was not significant. The last three columns in Table 4 present the result from the random effect probit estimates for sudden stops. Broadly speaking these results support those for current account reversals. The currency union indicator is never significant (although now some of the point estimates are positive). An increase in the (lagged) current account deficit increases the probability of a sudden stop, as does a higher incidence of sudden stops in the region. A somewhat surprising result is that according to these results, with other things given, a higher "initial" level of GDP per capita increases the probability of a sudden stop.
To summarize, the results obtained from the random effect probit panel regressions indicate that currency union countries don't face a lower probability than countries that have a national currency, of facing either sudden stops or current account reversals. The next question, and one addressed in the Section that follows, is whether currency union countries are affected by external shocks -including reversals and sudden stops -in the same way than countries with a national currency.
IV. Monetary Unions and Economic Performance: An Empirical Analysis from a Latin American Perspective
In this section I investigate whether belonging to a monetary union affects the way in which external shocks affect a county's rate of economic growth. As pointed out in Section II of this paper, one of the potential costs of monetary unions is that countries
give up independent monetary policy. This means that exchange rate adjustments cannot be used as a way of absorbing external shocks, including terms of trade shocks, current account reversals and sudden stops. How large these costs actually are is an empirical issue. In principle, if the countries belonging to a currency union have wages and prices flexibly -one of the OCA criteria -this cost would be rather low. In this case external shocks can be accommodated through changes in (real) wages and in domestic relative prices.
The question of how to accommodate international terms of trade shocks is particularly important for the Latin American nations. Traditionally, the countries in the region have been subject to substantial volatility in terms of trade shocks. For the period 1970-2001, for example, the standard deviation of rate of change of the terms of trade was 16.9%. For the same period terms of trade volatility for the advanced countries was only 6.5%; it was 14.5% in Asia.
IV.1 An Empirical Model
The point of departure of the econometric analysis is a two-equation formulation for the dynamics of real GDP per capita growth of country j in period t. Equation (3) (4)
j g is the long run rate of real per capita GDP growth in country j; j x is a vector of structural, institutional and policy variables that determine long run growth; j r is a vector of regional dummies; α, β and θ are parameters, and j ω is an error term assumed to be heteroskedastic. In equation (3), jt g is the rate of growth of per capita GDP in country j in period t. The terms jt v and jt u are shocks, assumed to have zero mean and finite variance. More specifically, jt v is assumed to be an external terms of trade shock, while jt u captures other shocks, including current account reversals or sudden stops. jt ε is an error term, which is assumed to have a variance component form, and λ, ϕ, and γ are parameters that determine the particular characteristics of the growth process. Equation (4) has the form of an equilibrium correction model and states that the actual rate of growth in period t will deviate from the long run rate of growth due to the existence of three types of shocks: v t j , u t j and ξ t j . Over time, however, the actual rate of growth will tend to converge towards it long run value, with the rate of convergence given by λ.
Parameterϕ , in equation (4), is expected to be positive, indicating that an improvement in the terms of trade will result in a (temporary) acceleration in the rate of growth, and that negative terms of trade shock are expected to have a negative effect on jt g . 19 If, as previous work has found, current account reversals and/or sudden stops have a negative effect on growth, we would expect the coefficient γ to be significantly negative.
In terms of the subject of this paper, the main interest is whether the coefficients of the external shocks v t j and u t j are different for currency union countries and countries 19 See Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2005) for details.
with a currency of their own. If giving up monetary independence because of membership in a currency union is costly, we would expect ϕ to be larger for currency union countries, and γ to be more negative in currency union countries than in countries with a currency of their own. That is, in the absence of monetary independence and exchange rate flexibility, external shocks would be amplified. If, on the contrary, the loss of monetary independence is not costly, these coefficients would be the same -or very similar -across the two groups of countries.
Equations (3) - (4) were estimated using a two-step procedure. In the first step I estimate the long run growth equation (3) using a cross-country data set. These data are averages for 1970-2001, and the estimation makes a correction for heteroskedasticity. These first stage estimates are then used to generate long-run predicted growth rates to replace j g in the equilibrium error correction model (4). In the second step, I estimated equation (4) using GLS for unbalanced panels; I used both random effects and fixed effects estimation procedures. 20 The data set includes 157 countries, for the 1970-2001 period; not every country has data for every year, however. See the Data Appendix for exact data definition and data sources. In Sub-Section IV.3 I present some extensions.
IV.2 Basic Results
In estimating equation (3) for long-run per capita growth, I followed the standard literature on growth, as summarized by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) , Sachs and Warner (1995) and Dollar (1992) among others. I assume that the rate of growth of GDP ( j g ) depends on a number of structural, policy and social variables. More specifically, I
include the following covariates: the log of initial GDP per capita; the investment ratio; the coverage of secondary education, as a proxy for human capital; an index of the degree of openness of the economy; the ratio of government consumption relative to GDP; and regional dummies. The results obtained from these first-step estimates are not reported due to space considerations.
In Table 5 I present the results from the second step estimation of the growth dynamics equation (4), when random effects were used. The Table has Overall, then, the results reported in Table 5 indicate that countries that belong to a currency union had suffered a greater impact from external shocks than countries with a national currency. The difference in the effects of external shocks is particularly large when the currency union countries are compared with nations that have had flexible exchange rates. This result is particularly important, since it is precisely under flexible exchange rates that countries are able to exercise fully an independent monetary policy.
IV.3 Instrumental Variables Estimates and Other Extensions
Instrumental Variables: Some of the results presented above may be subject to endogeneity problems. This is particularly the case of the specification that includes the current account reversals as a regressor. In this section I present results obtained when instrumental variables random effect regressions for unbalanced panels were estimated.
The results obtained are presented in Table 6 , for the same three samples: all countries with a national currency, flexible exchange rate nations and currency union countries. In deciding which instruments to use, I took into account the results in the preceding section on the probability of a country experiencing a reversal. The following instruments were used: lagged changes in the international terms of trade, lagged current account balance, lagged indicator for occurrence of sudden stop during the previous year, a lagged index of occurrence of sudden stops in the country's group or region, lagged international reserves over GDP ratio, lagged rate of growth of domestic credit. As may be seen from Table 6 , the results tend to confirm the findings reported in Table 5 . The estimated coefficients for both external shocks variables -changes in international terms of trade and current account reversals -are significantly larger for the currency union countries than for the two samples of countries with a national currency.
Asymmetric Terms of Trade Shocks:
The results discussed above were obtained under the assumption that positive and negative terms of trade shock have a symmetric effect on the dynamics of growth. This needs not be the case, however. 22 In order to investigate this issue re-estimated equation (4) shocks. The results obtained for the specification with the reversals shock are presented in Table 7 . The difference in the point estimate for the positive and negative terms of trade shock are particularly large for the currency union countries. Overall, these estimates, once again, confirm our previous findings, in the sense that external shocks have a larger effect on growth in currency union countries than in countries with a currency of their own.
Alternative Measures of External Shocks:
The results reported above were obtained using three alternative measures of external shocks: terms of trade changes, current account reversals, and sudden stops of capital inflows. As pointed out in Section III of this paper, there is a close connection between current account reversals and sudden
stops. An important question, thus, is the effect on economic activity of crises that are characterized by both current account reversals and sudden stops. 23 The results obtained, available upon request, tend to confirm those reported in Tables 5 through 7 : the (negative) effects of external crises on GDP growth tend to be more severe currency union countries than in countries with a currency of their own and flexible exchange rates.
V. Concluding Remarks
Recently effects of external crises on GDP growth have tended to be more severe currency union countries than in countries with a currency of their own and flexible exchange rates.
These results provide valuable additional information for the debate on the costs and benefits of countries giving up their national currencies and joining a currency union. It is important to notice, however, that the results reported here should be interpreted with some caution. The reason for this is that the number of Currency Union countries and years in the data set is limited. There are only three years of the Euro, and most non-euro CU countries are rather small. Additional data in the years to come will make the empirical analysis of performance in Currency Union countries more reliable. Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses; All regressors are one-period lagged; constant term is included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses; constant term is included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; is reported in parentheses; constant term is included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%;
